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Recent Developments

Yoswick v. State:

I

na case of first impression,
the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held, in Yoswick v.
State, 347 Md. 228, 700 A.2d 251
(1997), that parole eligibility is a
collateral rather than a direct
consequence of a criminal
defendant's
guilty
plea.
Therefore, the defendant does not
need to be informed of the parole
ramifications for the plea to be
.considered voluntary.
In so
holding, the court clarified the fact
that criminal defendants in
Maryland do not have a
constitutional right to be informed
of the consequences of their pleas
with regards to future parole
opportunities.
On February 25, 1992, David
Yoswick (uYoswick") kidnapped
Frank Storch ("Storch") and kept
him handcuffed in a motel
bathroom overnight. Yoswick then
took Storch via automobile to a
remote location in Carroll County
where Yoswick stabbed Storch in
the stomach with a knife. Yoswick
then tried to drown Storch by
holding his head under water at a
nearby creek.
Storch feigned
death and Yoswick left the scene.
Storch managed to stagger to a
nearby road where he was picked
up and taken to the Maryland
Shock Trauma Unit.
On February 27, 1992,
Yoswick drove to a landfill and
attempted to dump a bag of
Storch's posseSSions.
Soon
thereafter,
Yoswick
was
apprehended. Yoswick was then
indicted by a Grand Jury in Carroll
County in a twenty count indictment
including
kidnapping,
robbery and attempted first
degree murder. Charges were
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also pending against Yoswick in
Howard and Anne Arundel
Counties as a result of this
incident.
Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Yoswick pleaded
guilty to
attempted first degree murder and
kidnapping in Carroll County. The
State, in exchange for his plea,
entered a nolle prosequi on the
other eighteen charges and
recommended
to
other
jurisdictions in Maryland that they
drop their charges against
Yoswick. As a result of the plea,
Yoswick
received
life
imprisonment with all but forty
years
suspended
on
the
attempted murder charge and also
received thirty years on the
kidnapping charge, with the time
to be served concurrently.
Yoswick could have potentially
received, if convicted on all
charges in all three jurisdictions,
up to life plus 170 years in prison.
After the court accepted his
plea and sentenced him, Yo swick
filed a Petition for Post Conviction
Relief, alleging that he was
improperly informed of the parole
consequences of his plea.
Yoswick stated that his defense
counsel wrongly informed him that

he would be eligible for parole in
ten years, when a sentence of life
imprisonment carries a statutory
fifteen-year time limit before
parole eligibility commences.
Yoswick also alleged that he was
not informed of the necessity of
obtaining the Governor's approval
before he could receive parole.
He asserted that he pleaded guilty
because
he
had
received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The circuit court rejected his
claims and concluded that the
plea was knowing and voluntary.
The Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed. After careful
examination, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland also affirmed the
decision.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland began its analysis by
examining what makes a plea
valid. Yoswick, 347 Md. at 239,
700 A.2d at 256. First, a guilty
plea must be made voluntarily an~
intelligently. Id. (citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 242
(1969». The court explained that
the
defendant
must
have
knowledge
of
the
direct
consequences of the plea. Id.
(citing Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Hudson v.
State, 286 Md. 569, 595 (1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 845
(1980».
The court then defined a direct
consequence of a guilty plea as
one that has "'a definite,
immediate, and largely automatic
effect on the range of the
defendant's punishment.'"
Id.
(quoting Cuthrell v. Director,
Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364,
1366 (4th Cir.1973». It reasoned
that parole eligibility depends
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upon a number of factors that are
largely controlled by the inmate's
conduct as well as the decisions
of the Parole Commission. Id. at
241, 700 A.2d at 257. The court
stated that it has no control over
these factors and that parole
eligibility is a collateral, not a
direct, consequence. Id. The
court noted that due process does
not require that the defendant be
informed
of
the
collateral
consequences of his or her plea.
Id.
Also, a guilty plea is not
rendered involuntary because the
defendant was not informed of the
collateral consequences of the
plea. Id. It pointed to several
other court decisions which
agreed. Id. at 241-42, 700 A.2d at
257 -58 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 56 (1985); United States

v.

Sanc/emente-Bejarano,

861

F. 2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1988);
Brown V. Perini, 718 F.2d 784,
788 (6th Cir. 1983); Strader V.
Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 63 (4th Cir.
1979».
The court then turned its
attention to whether the trial court
imposed a mandatory fifteen-year
sentence on Yoswick. Id. at 242,
700 A.2d at 258. If there was a
mandatory sentence of· which
Yoswick was not informed,
Yoswick's plea would be invalid.
Id. (citing Hunter V. Fogg, 616
F.2d 55, 61 (2d Cir.1980». The
court opined that a mandatory
minimum sentence is one where
the court cannot exercise its
discretion when sentencing. Id.
(citing State ex. reI. Sonner V.
Shearin, 272 Md. 502, 518-19,
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325A.2d 573,582 (1974); State V.
Coban, 520 SO.2d 40, 42
(Fla.1988». The court held that
Yoswick did not receive a
mandatory minimum sentence
because the trial court exercised
its discretion by imposing a life
sentence with all but forty years
suspended. Id. at 242-43. Article
41, section 4-516 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, which provides
for a fifteen-year period before
parole can be granted, does not
constitute a mandatory minimum
sentence because, as the court
explained, "it does not change the
nature of the parole eligibility to
make it an automatic, definite, and
immediate
consequence
of
pleading guilty." Id. at 243.
The court then analyzed
whether Yoswick's counsel's
wrong advice pertaining to parole
deprived
him
of
effective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 244,
700 A.2d at 259. In order to
sustain a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the court
stated, Yoswick must "'prove that
counsel's
performance
was
deficient and that the deficient
performance
prejudiced
the
defense.'" Id. (quoting Oken v.
State, 343 Md. 256, 283, 409 A.2d
692,705 (1996), cert. denied, 117
S.Ct. 742 (1997». The court
stated that in order to prove
prejudice, Yoswick must show that
but for his counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on a trial. Id.
at 245 (citing Hill V. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985». The court
bolstered its argument by pointing

out that Yoswick could have
received life imprisonment plus
170 years if he had proceeded to
trial, compared to the forty years
of imprisonment he actually
received. Id. at 246-47,700 A.2d
at 260. Additionally, the record
. did not reflect any reluctance on
Yoswick's part when he made the·
plea. Id. The court also noted
that Yoswick could become
eligible for parole in less than
fifteen years, possibly even less
than eleven years and two
months. Id. at 249 n.7, 700 A.2d
at 261 n.7. The court held that
Yoswick was not prejudiced by his
counsel's misinformation because
the court believed that a
reasonable
defendant
in
Yoswick's situation would have
pleaded guilty even without any
information about parole eligibility.
Id. at 246, 700 A.2d at 260. The
court concluded that Yoswick
"clearly received the benefit of the
bargain." Id. at 247.
Significantly, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in Yoswick V.
State held that the parole
consequences of a guilty plea are
collateral. As a result of this
decision, trial courts and defense
counsel in Maryland are not
required to advise criminal
defendants of the ramifications of
guilty pleas on parole eligibility.
Thus, the court held that parole
eligibility is not a mitigating factor
to be considered when a criminal
defendant makes a guilty plea and
subsequently attempts to reverse
a guilty plea by raising parole
issues on appeal.

